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In the Supreme CoUrt 
of the State of Utah 
SCOTT ANDERSON, FRED H. SHEP-
ARD, EARL M. BAKER, RICH-
ARD W. TIPPITTS, and EARL J. 
KNUDSON, 
Plaintiffs and Apptllants, 
vs. 
W. ADRIAN WRIGHT and W. 
MEEKS WIRTHLIN, partners, do-
ing business under the names and 
style of WRIGHT- WIRTHLIN 
REALTORS, 
Defendants and Respondents. 
Case No. 8140 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS 
PRELIMINARY STATEMENT 
Throughout this brief, plaintiffs and appellants will be re-
ferred to as plaintiffs, defendants· and respondents will be 
referred to as defendants. All italics are ours. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
December, 195 3, plaintiffs commenced a consolidated ac-
tion against defendants. In such action plaintiffs individually 
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prayed judgment against defendants for amounts claimed to 
be due from defendants under similar oral contracts (R. 1). 
The total amount demanded was $16,375.35. At trial, it ap-
pearing to the court that the claims asserted were clearly un-
supported in the evidence, plaintiffs were allowed to file an 
amended complaint wherein it was alleged that plaintiffs 
undertook to sell certain houses in a subdivision of Salt Lake 
County known as Morningside Heights; that the commission per 
house sold was to be $100.00; that certain houses were sold· 
' 
that certain amounts remain unpaid; that such amounts are 
presently due and owing from defendants to plaintiffs (R. 5). 
The jury found for plaintiffs on the amended complaint 
(R. 230). After judgment and on motion of defendants, the 
trial· court granted defendants' motion for a directed verdict 
(theretofore made and taken under advisement) and entered 
judgment for defendants notwithstanding the verdict (R. 
232 and 237). The trial court's action was bottomed on the 
insufficiency of the evidence to support a present contractural 
duty in defendants to pay plaintiffs the monies demanded in 
the amended complaint. The sole question for determination 
on appeal is the sufficiency or insufficiency of the evidence 
to support the verdict of the jury. 
In 1950, Felt Syndicate, a corporation, was engaged in 
the development of a Salt Lake County subdivision known as 
Morningside Heights. It was the sponsor of the development 
and the seller of the lots and homes making up the subdivision. 
Defendants, after a considerable expenditure of time and 
effort, entered into an arrangement with Felt Syndicate to 
exclusively broker for Felt Syndicate the sale of one hundred 
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lots and unbuilt houses in the development at a commission 
of $300.00 per house (Exhibit 4). In April or May of 1950 
opportunity to assist in this enterprise was ~xtended by de-
fendants to the plaintiffs and others as members of defendants' 
sales force (R. 89, 111). Defendants and plaintiffs entered 
into an arrangement wherein plaintiffs, among others, were 
given an opportunity to sell or take orders for certain lots and 
unbuilt homes in Morningside Heights. The proposed cotl].~ 
pensation to plaintiffs per unbuilt house and lot sold "'as to 
be $100.00 (R. 111, R. 112). Neither the defendants as the 
broker nor the salesmen were to receive from Felt Syndicate, 
the seller, any n1onies at the time an ord.er was taken or a 
house was sold (R. 50, 52, 122). Commissions earned were to 
be paid over by Felt Syndicate, the seller, on a deferred basis 
at certain designated times corresponding to the tirnes vlhen 
the houses being built had reached certain designated stages 
of completion. Commissions were to be paid over by the seller 
through its disbursal agent to the broker, W right-Wirthlin, 
who upon receipt of the monies from the seller would in turn 
disburse to the salesmen their proportionate share of the com-
missions earned (R. 70, 112, 161, 183, 202-203, 207, 208). 
For ease of bookkeeping the broker and plaintiffs agreed that 
the broker would accumulate the monies received from the 
seller until such time as the broker had received sufficient 
monies from the seller to disburse to the plaintiffs amounts 
equal to 25 per cent of $100 (R. 55-56; 208, 209). 
Plaintiffs and additional members of defendants' sales 
force took orders for and sold all of the lots and unbuilt 
houses in Felt Syndicate's development. Felt Syndicate, the 
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seller, through its disbursal agent intermittently paid over to 
the broker, Wright-Wirthlin, monies aggregating $12,790.74. 
Out of the amount thus received, defendant brokerage dis-
bursed to plaintiffs their proportionate share, in the amounts 
and at the times as set forth in Exhibit 3. Felt Syndicate in 
addition to the monies paid to defendant brokerage, assigned 
to defendants twelve lot options of the reasonable value of 
$1800.00. In return defendant brokerage extinguished $1800.00 
of the amount due from Felt Syndicate on the total commis-
sions and immediately disbursed to plaintiffs cash equal to 
their proportionate share of said credit. Total credits and 
monies received from Felt Syndicate aggregate $14-,590.74 
out of which as set forth in Exhibit 3, plaintiffs have received 
slightly more than their proportionate share. 
There remains unpaid by Felt Syndicate the sum of $15,-
409.26 out of which if and when received by defendants, de-
fendants will pay over to plaintiffs their proportionate share 
according to the terms and conditions of their sales arrangement. 
There is no question that a sales arrangement was entered 
into between plaintiffs and defendants (R. 111, 112). The 
problem is as to the duty on the part of defendants to presently 
pay over to plaintiffs the amounts demanded in the amended 
complaint. The court ably instructed the jury as follows in 
pointing up that matter: 
Ct ••• Now the parties have stipulated that such a 
contract was entered into. There is however, left and 
in dispute the terms and conditions under which these 
commissions were to be paid and the question of 
whether or not there are any commissions no·w due and 
owing to these plaintiffs from these defendants ... 
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n * * * The things you must find in favor of these 
plaintiffs and against these defendants is the following: 
n * * * ( 2) That under and pursuant to the terms 
of the contract the commissions are now due, owing 
and payable from these defendants to these plaintiffs 
... · " (R. 223, 224). 
The court when it speaks of the ((terms of the contract" is, 
of course, referring to the oral contract between plaintiffs and 
defendants. 
Plaintiffs have spent considerable space in their brief 
talking around and about fraud and overeaching. Suffice to 
call to the court's attention that neither in the original com-
plaint nor in the amended complaint is there any allegation 
of fraud or wrongdoing. Plaintiffs do not raise on appeal any 
allegation of error on the part of the trial court in admitting 
or excluding evidence of the insinuated fraud. It is elementary 
that one who brings an action footed in fraud must allege his 
facts with particularity. See Rule 9-b. Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure. It would seem that that which was neither alleged 
in the original nor the amended complaint can hardly with 
propriety be argued on appeal. 
POINT I 
THERE IS INSUFFICIENT EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT 
A PRESENT CONTRACTUAL DUTY IN DEFENDANTS 
TO PAY PLAINTIFFS THE AMOUNTS DEMANDED IN 
THE AMENDED COMPLAINT. 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THERE IS INSUFFICIENT EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT 
A PRESENT CONTRACTUAL DUTY IN DEFENDANTS 
TO PAY PLAINTIFFS THE AMOUNTS DEMANDED IN 
THE AMENDED COMPLAINT. 
The trial court correctly granted judgment for defendants and 
against plaintiffs notwithstanding the verdict because of the in-
sufficiency of the evidence to support a present contractual 
duty in defendants to pay plaintiffs the monies demanded in 
the amended complaint. 
There is no dispute as to plaintiff's general statement 
of the law applicable in the cases of this nature. The ap-
plicable proposition of law is well known and generally ac-
cepted. The law is well stated in the case of Morby v. Rogers, 
____ Utah ____ ,. 252 P 2d 231, p. 232 as follows: 
~]t is well settled that in order for a court to grant 
a request for a directed verdict or for a judgment not-
withstanding the verdict grounded on non-negligence 
of defendant, the record must disclose no evidence 
against the party so requesting upon which reasonable 
minds could find him guilty of the negligence charged. 
The issue here, then was whether the record disclosed 
any evidence upon which the jury could have found 
the appellant guilty of negligence.'' 
Though the above quoted case sounds in tort and the in-
stant case sounds in contract, the general rule is equally ap-
plicable. See Scoville v. Kelloggs Sales Company, ____ Utah ____ , 
261 P 2d 933. Translated to a contract fact situation, the 
rule could be stated as follows: 
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nit is well settled that in order for a court to grant a 
request for a directed verdict or for a judgment not-
withstanding the verdict because of the non-existence 
of a contractural duty sought to be imposed, the record 
must disclose no evidence against the party so request-
ing from which reasonable minds could infer the ex-
istence of the duty." 
An examination of the evidence reveals no evidentiary 
base to support the required inference of a present contractual 
duty in defendants to personally pay plaintiffs the sums de-
manded. One needs ask, if such a purported duty exists, at 
what point in time did it arise? An examination of the evi-
dence (in preference to the assertions of plaintiffs) will, of 
course, reveal that such a duty has yet to arise. It is the position 
of the defendants that it was within the contemplation and 
agreement of defendants and their sales force that the de-
fendants' duty to pay plaintiffs the monies demanded would 
arise only upon receipt by defendants from the seller, Felt 
Syndicate, of the commission monies earned. 
This position is based on two evidentiary foundations. 
( 1) The express understanding of the parties as revealed by 
their testimony. (2) The custom of the real estate business. 
The evidence is without dispute that more than one half 
of the commission monies earned has yet to be received by 
the defendants from Felt Syndicate, the seller. Felt Syndicate, 
of course, suffered financial reverses. That fact supplies the 
revealing reason for the commencement of this lawsuit. The 
revealing facts indicated in the testimony excerpts which fol-
low, are that all parties contemplated ( 1) defendant broker 
would receive the monies from the seller prior to his payment 
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over to the salesmen of their proportionate share, and ( 2) as 
a general custom a broker would not pay out of his own pocket 
sales commissions on a. deal that had "gone sour." 
Beginning at R. 48, plaintiff Anderson testified that his 
sales commissions were going to come on a basis different from 
usual; that rather than dividing with the broker at the time 
of sale the commission extracted from the usual down payment, 
no monies were to be received initially; that the first installment 
on the commission was to be made at some tim~ in the future; 
that commissions were to come on a deferred, periodic, basis; 
that defendants were to collect the commissions fron1 Felt 
Syndicate, the seller; that defendants were to retain the com-
missions thus collected until they had sufficient monies credited 
to plaintiffs to disburse commissions to plaintiffs in amounts 
equal to 2 5 per cent of commissions earned; that on several 
occasions defendants did disburse to plaintiff Anderson com-
mission payments which were received by Anderson at the 
times paid without protest or demands for additional payment. 
At page 70 of the Record the following testimony of plaintiff 
Anderson is recorded: 
"Q. So, by way of recapitulation you, at the time of 
the Morningside Heights transaction, agreed to 
sell these homes for the sum of $100.00 apiece. 
* * * * 
"A. Yes. 
ceQ. And you understood that the payments were to 
come from Wright-Wirthlin, that they were to 
collect the payments for you did you not? 
CCA. Yes. 
10 
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nQ. And that they were to disburse them to you as they 
received them on a deferred basis, based on the 
degree of completion of the homes you had sold? 
nA. Yes." 
A fair and reasonable reading of this testimony indicates 
that plaintiff Anderson contemplated receipt by defendants 
from Felt Syndicate of the commission monies prior to the 
time they were to be disbursed to the salesmen. The nzonies 
U'ere to be accumulated until the sum was large enough to 
pay out to plaintiff salesmen with bookkeeping ease. Certainly 
such an arrangement would be unnecessary if the duty to pay 
arose in defendants prior to the time the monies were received. 
It was in addition, initially contemplated that the broker would 
obtain from the seller monies at various stages of house con-
struction. One of the stages was the final completion of the 
houses. Mr. Anderson at page 58 in response to an inquiry 
states: 
nA. The homes that I have sold have been occupied 
by the people who purchased, or subsequently pur-
chased and sold, for many months, and I still be-
lieve they aren't considered as having been com-
pleted.'' 
He further states at page 59 of the Record: 
CCA. No, I don't know if they are 100 per cent com-
pleted or not." 
The testimony of others, including Mr. Doidge of the financing 
institution, re-affirm the non-completion of the homes (R. 
138, 15 7, 167-168). 
Plaintiff Baker reinforces the position of defendants on 
page 99 of the Record where the following questions were put 
and the following answers gtven: 
11 
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CtQ. Mr. Baker, have you ever been paid on a cotnmis-
sion that the broker didn't receive the money first? 
teA. No, I don't think I have. That question is a little 
strange though, Reed. Can I qualify it a little? 
HQ. Just answer my question if you will. Let me guide 
you along. Mr. King will bring anything out, I'm 
sure. You have never had a broker pay you a com-
mission on a deal that has gone sour, have you, 
out of his own pocket? 
HA. No. 
C(Q. You didn't expect it? 
(CA. No, I didn't expect it." 
Plaintiff Baker testified in addition that the commissions 
were to be paid on a deferred basis; that he understood Felt 
Syndicate was the seller; that he would like to get his money 
from whoever owes it. 
Plaintiff Knudson testified as follows on page 112 of the 
Record: 
'Q. And isn't it is the custom that the salesman doesn't 
receive his money until the broker does ? 
There are different circumstances on that. When 
you sell a house you usually bring in enough money 
to pay that commission. 
That is correct. But the general rule is that the 
salesman doesn't get his money until the broker 
does, isn't it ? 
That's right." 
He further testified on page 115 of the Record as follows: 
"Q. It is customary that the seller pays the commission 
on these sales, isn't it? 
12 
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HA. That's right. 
HQ. And you expected that this situation was usual 
and when the seller would pay the money to 
Wright-Wirthlin they would pay you would they 
not? 
HA. If they got it. 
((Q. You knew that they would pay it if they got it? 
((A. Yes, I had confidence in Wright-Wirthlin." 
And at page 116 of the Record, plaintiff Knudson states 
further: 
HQ. You didn't expect them (Wright-Wirthlin) to pay 
you from their own monies on this transaction 
did you, Mr. Knudson? 
HA. I wasn't under that impression.'~ 
Plaintiff Shepard's testimony didn't materially differ from 
that of the other three plaintiffs. He testified that he was to 
sell at $100.00 per house; that no monies except loan costs 
were to be received from the purchaser of a house; that such 
monies received were not to be divided by the broker or the 
salesmen; that it would be some time before the broker was 
to get the first portion of the commission; that when the houses 
were at various stages of completion the broker was to get 
various commission draws; that commission payments were 
to be on a deferred basis; that he inquired of defendants about 
the collection of monies from Felt Syndicate; that he never 
demanded payment from Wright-Wirthlin; that he received 
various disbursements without protest. 
13 
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In accord with the testimony of the plaintiffs, .1\lr. Wirthlin, 
one of the defendants, testified that the proposed compensation 
per house sold was to be $100.00 (R. 151, 161); that the 
commissions were to be paid on a deferred basis as the house 
construction progressed; that the salesman's share of the com-
missions earned would be paid over upon receipt of the com-
missions from the seller (R. 161); th.at the proportionate 
share of the monies received from the seller has been dis-
bursed to the salesmen; that any monies received in the future 
from the seller would likewise be disbursed to the salesmen 
(R. 164) ; that the houses have not yet been completed (R. 15 7). 
Mr. Walker, a member of the sales force at the time of 
the Morningside Heights transaction, and who was present 
at the sales meetings at which the sales arrangement was dis-
cussed, testified as follows at page 183 of the Record: 
etQ. And did he (Mr. Wirthlin) tell you where or 
how the money was to be paid ? 
'CA. He told us that the money would be paid to us 
as fast as it would be paid to them." 
Mrs. Ackerson, a member of the sales force at the time 
of the same transaction, at page 203 of the Record testified as 
follows: 
ceQ. And how was the sum to be paid to you? 
etA. As the houses were completed. A certain percent-
age as the brokers received their money." 
Mr. Wright, another of the defendants; testified at page 
207 of the Record as follows: 
etA. We were to receive our money at various stages as 
14 
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the construction progressed and the salesmen in 
turn were to get their money as we were paid ours." 
And at page 208: 
((Q. Now with reference to your salesmen, how were 
they to be paid, Mr. Wright? 
((A: They were to receive their proportionate share as 
we received ours." 
Noting: 
( 1) Over half the commissions earned remain uncollected 
from the seller. 
( 2) Commissions were to be disbursed on a deferred basts 
to plaintiffs after receipt from seller by defendants. 
( 3) Plaintiffs commissions were to be accumulated by 
defendants until a sufficient amount was accumulated to be 
paid out in sums of $25.00 or simdar amounts. 
( 4) The custom of the real estate business is that the 
broker receives the commission money prior to the payment 
over to the salesman of his share of a commission. 
( 5) Plaintiffs didn't expect defendants to pay plaintiffs 
from their own monies nor did they expect payment on a 
deal ((gone sour"-then, reasonable minds noting such facts 
and considering them in the light most favorable to the plain-
tiffs, could not find a present existing contractual duty in de-
fendants to pay plaintiffs the monies demanded. To the con-
trary, reasonable minds could only conclude that such a duty 
had yet to arise. 
Ley v. Fred T. Ley and Co., 65 N. Y. S. 2d 843, well states 
the law as follows: 
15 
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((The pertinent law is succinctly stated in Clark's New 
York Law of Contracts Vol. 2, Sec. 964, as follows: 
(An agreement by a person to make payments to another 
from a particular fund to be realized in the future, 
if based on a consideration, is valid and binding, but 
in such a case the realization of the fund is ordinarily 
a condition precedent to any liability on the part of 
the promisor to make the payments'." 
Mascioni v. Miller, 184 N. E. 473, 261 N.Y. 1 ( 1933) 
is a case in point of persuasive authority. In that case a general 
contractor promised to pay a sub-contractor for his work and 
materials ((Payments to be made as received from the owner." 
This was held to make receipt of the money from the owner 
an express condition; and the court said that ((the event upon 
which that promise would ripen into an absolute immediate 
obligation has not oc~urred." Likewise in the instant case the 
necessary event-the receipt of the monies from the seller by 
the defendants-has not occurred. Until the occurrence of such 
an event there is no present existing contractual duty on the 
part of defendants. to pay plaintiffs the monies d~manded. This 
is inescapably made clear by the testimony of the parties as 
to ( 1) the express understanding of the parties, and ( 2) the 
custom of the business. Reasonable men can draw but one in-
ference. That inference points to the lack of a present existing 
contractual duty on the part of defendants. to pay plaintiffs the 
monies demanded. 
CONCLUSION 
A revie\v of the entire proceedings and the law in relation 
thereto shov1s that the evidence is insufficient to support a pres-
16 
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ent contractual duty in defendants to pay plaintiffs the monies 
demanded. It is respectfully submitted therefore that the action 
of the trial court in entering judgment for defendants and 
against the plaintiffs notwithstanding the verdict should be 
affirmed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
]. REED TUFT 
BRUCE S. JENKINS 
Counsel for Respondents 
53 East 4th South 
202 Newhouse Realty Bldg. 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
Received ____________ copies of the foregoing Brief this ___________ _ 
day of May, 1954. 
Counsel for Appellants 
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